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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 10-2540 
___________ 
 
WAYNE ASTON MORRIS, 
                                             Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                               Respondent  
____________________________________ 
 
Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A044-137-609) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable  Andrew Arthur 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 9, 2010 
 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed November 12, 2010) 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Wayne Aston Morris petitions for review of a decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA).  For the reasons below, we will deny the petition for review. 
 Morris, a native of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States in 1993 as a 
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conditional permanent resident.  He became a lawful permanent resident in 1997.  In 
February 2009, he was charged as removable as an aggravated felon.  Morris proceeded 
pro se and admitted the factual allegations of the charges of removability.  The 
Immigration Judge (IJ) found him removable and ineligible for any relief.  The IJ ordered 
Morris removed to Jamaica.  After proceedings not relevant here, Morris successfully 
appealed to the BIA. 
 Morris argued before the BIA that he was a citizen based on his pending 
application for naturalization and his allegiance to the United States.  The BIA concluded 
that Morris had not shown that he was prima facie eligible for naturalization because the 
DHS had not submitted any affirmative communication establishing that Morris would be 
eligible if not for the removal proceedings.  It determined that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider Morris’s constitutional challenges to the immigration laws.  Morris filed a 
timely petition for review. 
 Morris contends that he is a citizen because he filed an application for 
naturalization and has established that he owes permanent allegiance to the United States.  
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A), we have jurisdiction to review a claim of nationality if 
there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to that claim.  The parties do not 
dispute the underlying facts of the claim.  We exercise plenary review over Morris’s 
claim of citizenship.  Jordon v. Att’y Gen., 424 F.3d 320, 328 (3d Cir. 2005).  We have 
held that for a citizen of another country, “nothing less than citizenship will show 
permanent allegiance to the United States.” Salim v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 307, 310 (3d Cir. 
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2003) (internal quotation omitted). 
 Morris argues that the IJ should have terminated the removal proceedings to allow 
him to pursue his pending naturalization application pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f).  
That regulation allows for termination of the proceedings if the alien has established 
prima facie eligibility for naturalization and the matter involves exceptionally appealing 
or humanitarian factors.  However, in Zegrean v. Attorney General, 602 F.3d 273, 275 
(3d Cir. 2010), we held that 8 U.S.C. § 1429 prohibits the Attorney General from 
considering a naturalization application if a removal proceeding is pending against the 
alien.  Moreover, Morris’s conviction for an aggravated felony prevents him from 
demonstrating that he is of good moral character as is required for naturalization.  See 8 
U. S.C. § 1427(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7), (8). 
 Morris admits that he was convicted of conspiracy to distribute more than 500 
grams of cocaine.  He contends that he was never advised during his criminal 
proceedings that he would be removed from the United States if he pleaded guilty.  
Removal proceedings, however, are not the appropriate venue for Morris to collaterally 
challenge his convictions.  See Drakes v. INS, 330 F.3d 600 (3d Cir. 2003).  Morris does 
not allege that he has filed any challenge to his convictions.  Even if he had, the pendency 
of a post-conviction motion does not negate the finality of a conviction for immigration 
purposes until the conviction is overturned.  Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 
(3d Cir. 2008). 
 Morris argues that he qualifies for a waiver of removal under former 8 U.S.C. §§ 
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212(c) & (h).  However, he concedes that he is not eligible for such relief as an 
aggravated felon.  Morris also argues that he is challenging the constitutionality of the 
immigration laws.  He does not specify which statutes he challenges or explain how they 
violate the Constitution.  Before the BIA, he contended that his removal would violate the 
Constitution if the hardship to his citizen children and wife is not considered.  Morris’s 
removal will not violate any substantive right of his or his family protected by the Due 
Process clause.  See Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1091 
(9
th
 Cir. 2010).  Moreover, Morris admitted that waivers of removal pursuant to § 212(c) 
and § 212(h) are unavailable to legal permanent residents who were aggravated felons 
and conceded that this distinction had survived rational basis scrutiny.  A.R. at 17; see 
DiPeppe v. Quarantillo, 337 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 2003); De Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft, 293 
F.3d 633, 638 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
